By Yusuf Dhia-Allah

Like him or not, there is one personality in Iraq who cannot be ignored: Sayyed Muqtada al-Sadr. The Iraqi political elites deliberately shun him; instead they have willingly fallen into the trap set by the US occupation forces euphemistically called the “democratic” process. The purpose here is not to examine the technicalities of fraud that took place during Iraq’s recent elections but to evaluate the position of Iraqi political forces vis-a-vis that of Sayyed Muqtada al-Sadr. But first, we must take a quick detour into history and the classic principles of political science.

   One of the core objectives of state and non-state actors in politics is to achieve power in order to persuade or force adversaries to do something they would not otherwise do. The mode of pursuit of power often depends on what will force others to do what they do not want to do. During the Islamic Revolution in Iran, power was manifested not in terms of military operations but the Islamic movement’s ability to bring people out into the streets for peaceful protests against the tyrannical regime of the Shah. At the time of the Zionist occupation of Lebanon, power was manifested in terms of the number of tanks the Islamic resistance could destroy and the armed marauders of the occupation army it could eliminate.

   The same applies to other parts of the world. During the Nazi occupation of France, the French Resistance competed with the Nazi installed Vichy government in terms of how many people each side could bring into their camp. The common denominator of power in all these cases was to demonstrate the ability to do a thing or a set of things which the opposing side viewed as a powerful force to reckon with and therefore agree to compromise. The Shah would probably not have been overthrown if the Islamic movement in Iran had only used military force against his forces of oppression. Neither would Hizbullah have managed to free Lebanon if it only concentrated on public demonstrations. The method pursued was set by the occupying force which through its own technique dictated the mode of resistance. Since the Shah claimed his tyrannical rule was legitimized through the people’s will, the Islamic movement aimed to demonstrate that the people’s will was against the Shah and the best way to do that was through mass demonstrations. Israel tried to justify its occupation of Lebanon primarily through military means so the best way to combat Israeli aggression was through military resistance.

   In Iraq today the US justifies its occupation based on three claims: the so-called will of the Iraqi people (“democracy”); security threat to US interests, and a less publicly-advertised reason, but one which is clearly evident from the rhetoric of US officials that can best be summarized in two related phrases: we occupy because we can, or might makes right. Based on these, it becomes evident that the US presence in Iraq is founded on military aggression and a fake political process which they choose to name “democracy.” Therefore, there are two key dimensions to the US occupation of Iraq: military and political. This means that any Iraqi leader or movement that takes either the military or political option out of the liberation struggle will fail to achieve liberation and become politically weak. The only public figure in Iraq who has not taken out armed resistance from the liberation process is Muqtada al-Sadr. Therefore, he represents the only political force which addresses the issue of occupation at fundamental levels: political and military.

   It is known and accepted by all informed observers that Sayyed Muqtada’s prestige and fame increased when his movement launched armed resistance to challenge the forces of occupation in 2004 and again in 2007. To put it more precisely, Muqtada without the battle of Najaf in 2004 would not be where he is today. The US occupation forces and many Iraqi people outside his core constituency would not have known much about who Muqtada is and what his movement represents in terms of social services in Iraq. Muqtada’s combination of political and military resistance earned him the status of “kingmaker” in Iraqi politics because he acquired power that the US and allied forces had to reckon with. He did this by keeping all options on the table. Imagine if the French Resistance had announced in 1942 that it was abandoning armed resistance and would negotiate with the Nazis; would the latter have even let them near the negotiating table? What if the US had announced during the cold war that it would never use military force to contain communism in Europe and had withdrawn its forces from the European theatre; would the communist leaders of USSR have negotiated the status of Berlin with the US?

   Nouri al-Maliki and other political figures and parties that participated in the so-called “political” process drawn up by the US did not keep all options on the table and this made them disposable. Otherwise the US, the real rulers of Iraq, would not dare claim that the man who supported US shelling of the mosque of Imam Ali was the favorite of the Iraqi people. All Muslims agree that Imam Ali is not a sectarian figure, as the enemies of Islam try to portray him. Imam Ali is the personality through whom Allah (Â) wiped out the forces of oppression at Badr, Khaybar, Khandak and Nahrawan and kept Islamic morals and knowledge alive. Imam Ali is the figure who is loved by all Muslims regardless of their school of thought.

   Those familiar with the Iraqi society know that it is deeply religious; they also know that in free and fair elections Ayad Allawi, the person who openly backed the attack on Imam Ali’s mosque, would not be elected as head of government. Just a few months prior to elections, most political analysts did not even consider Allawi a serious contender. They underlined Allawi’s CIA connection as having so discredited him that his chances of winning any seats were highly questionable. The reason the US declared Allawi the winner was because they knew they could get away with it. Who would hold them answerable for fraudulent elections? Certainly not those who only a few weeks earlier were proclaiming the US-organized process as the only viable “solution” to Iraq’s calamities.

   Al-Maliki’s sobbing after the US allowed Allawi to “win” the “elections” should serve as a salutary lesson to all Iraqi political forces and Islamic movements everywhere. A political process drawn up by occupation forces with more than 100,000 troops on the ground can never be fair and transparent. Maliki and his cohorts must know that the principle aim of the occupation forces is to maintain control through cronies like Allawi. It is an historical axiom: were the Nazis interested in fair elections when they imposed a Vichy government on France?

   When Muqtada raised the banner of resistance in 2004, other Iraqi political groups laughed at him and rebuked him. Muqtada is now having the last laugh. The approach to keep all moral and legitimate options on the table is a historical tool that occupied people everywhere have used to liberate themselves. Conversely, no people have forced the invaders out by abandoning the option of resistance, an option that frightens the occupiers the most. Muqtada’s ability to combine armed resistance with carefully planned political moves that have the tacit approval of Ayatollah Ali Sistani shows that Muqtada is correct in his approach. He is able to shake the foundations of occupation. Even the Pentagon’s 2006 report to Congress admitted that Muqtada al-Sadr was the biggest threat to the US in Iraq. Thus, it becomes inescapable to conclude that Muqtada not Maliki and associates must lead the liberation struggle and not allow their egos to get in the way.